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Recently, a company named Adappcity Inc. launched a new application called UppstArt. The app purports to use blockchain technology to enable visual artists to
“track” art they sell such that i and when it is later resold, they are able to en orce a so-called “resale royalty.” A resale royalty is a mandatory, predetermined
payment made by a subsequent purchaser to the artist who created the work. This payment is made in addition to whatever price the subsequent purchaser pays to
the seller o the work.
According to a press release, UppstArt works by issuing a digital certiﬁcate o authenticity that records and preserves in ormation about a work’s authorship and
price history. When a work o art is resold, this record goes with it, and the artist is automatically paid a resale royalty. In other words, a subsequent purchaser
agrees to terms that include a resale royalty and the app automatically en orces this term. In this way, UppstArt looks like any other “smart contract” currently
pervading the Internet o Things (IoT).
Smart contracts give manu acturers o smart products and devices—such as cars and speakers—the ability to remotely, and unilaterally, en orce terms o service.
For example, rental car companies can use tracking devices to charge customers punitive ees or driving outside o state lines where ﬁne print in the rental contract
so prohibits. Sonos, maker o smart speaker systems, recently announced changes to its data collection and privacy policy that users are obligated to accept in order
to receive necessary so ware updates. Without those updates, the speakers will cease to unction.
The interesting thing about UppstArt is that it aims to en orce a term—the payment o a resale royalty— that has been repeatedly considered and explicitly rejected
by Congress. Previous bills introducing a resale royalty include the American Royalties Too (“ART”) Act o 2015, the Equity or Visual Artists Act o 2011, the
Visual Artists Rights Act o 1987, the Visual Artists Rights Amendment o 1986, and the Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act o 1978. Most recently, the Ninth
Circuit Court o Appeals struck down Cali ornia’s Resale Royalty Act—legislation that allowed artists to collect 5% o all secondary market sales o their work
conducted either in Cali ornia or by a Cali ornia-based company—as an unconstitutional violation o the Commerce Clause.
To date, all legislative attempts to institute a resale royalty have ailed. This is so despite the existence o an equivalent droit de suite in the European Union, and
despite a recent report rom the Copyright Oﬃce urging their passage. The Copyright Oﬃce’s report relies heavily on the act that visual artists engage in a “oneshot” market—i.e., they earn money on a single sale o a work, as opposed to, say, a recording artist, who may earn repeatedly on copies o her work—to conclude
that these artists are disadvantaged by the current copyright system and might be helped by institution o a resale royalty. Congress’ continued reticence toward
adoption o a resale royalty has been applauded by some commentators who see the concept as avoring elite artists at the cost o lesser-known artists, and decried
by others who view resale royalties as generative o art more generally.
Regardless o the propriety o resale royalties, the UppstArt app imposes a payment that Congress not only doesn’t recognize, but has also made clear is not owed.
It is this regulatory override, and extra-regulatory en orcement by private ordering, that diﬀerentiates UppstArt rom many other smart contracts.
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To be sure, private override o public law is not new. For example, Section 1201 o the Digital Millennium Copyright Act arguably allows content owners to use
Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) technology to block potential air uses o content that copyright law might otherwise allow. Like DRM, UppstArt uses
technology to automate unilateral en orcement o extra-regulatory terms. Unlike DRM, however, UppstArt uses technology to introduce a new right—in this case,
a right to payment— or which there is no statutory basis.
Commenters have long expressed concern about rights accretion in the copyright context, blaming a combination o statutory ambiguity—particularly in the
context o air use—and high-stakes penalties or in ringement. For example, the New York Times, in a notorious abundance o caution, licensed our lines o
poetry or an editorial that clearly qualiﬁed as parody (thereby exempting it rom licensing). The primary concern is that over-licensing can lead to a eedback loop
in which others in the space ace an expectation o licensing notwithstanding the absence o a legal obligation.
UppstArt’s use o blockchain technology potentially raises the stakes. Unlike rights accretion resulting rom statutory ambiguity, which might be mitigated with
simpler statutory language and/or clearer precedent, the technological rights accretion exhibited by UppsArt doesn’t suggest an obvious solution. Perhaps none is
needed. An alternate interpretation o UppstArt’s business model might be as a signal to the legislature that not only can the market bear such a royalty, but even
what that value might look like. As technology enables more o such regulatory overrides, it will be interesting to see i they tend toward ne arious, unilateral termsetting, or instead serve to improve the in ormation available to lawmakers.
Kristelia A. García (@kristelia) is an associate pro essor at the University o Colorado Law School, where she teaches copyright, trademark, and property. She also serves as a
director o the Silicon Flatirons Center or Law, Technology and Entrepreneurship. Prior to entering academia, Kristelia practiced in ﬁrms and in-house in the music industry,
most recently at Universal Music Group. Comments, compliments, and criticism couched as such welcome at kristelia@colorado.edu.
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